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The Propensity to Split and CEO
Compensation
Erik Devos, William B. Elliott, and Richard S. Warr∗
We analyze the relation between the delta and vega of a chief executive officer’s (CEO) com-
pensation and the propensity of the firm to engage in a split. Controlling for other well-known
factors, we find that CEOs with compensation that has higher levels of delta are more likely to
split their shares. Furthermore, the choice of split factor is inversely related to delta. Our results
are economically significant: for the average (median) firm in our sample, a stock split results in
a CEO wealth gain of $4.9 million ($84,000).
Early studies of stock splits document a strong and positive abnormal return upon their an-
nouncement (see, e.g., Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996). Subsequent authors have attempted
to identify factors that either trigger stock splits or that are related to the abnormal announcement
returns resulting from the split announcement. Researchers have posited a variety of explanations
for stock splits, including signaling to reduce information asymmetry (Brennan and Copeland,
1988; Dharan and Ikenberry, 1995; Ikenberry et al., 1996), adjusting the stock price to an optimal
trading range (Copeland, 1979; Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt, 2004; Dyl and Elliott,
2006) or to an optimal tick size (Angel, 1997; Harris, 1997), and to increase the tax option
value for investors (Lamoureux and Poon, 1987). In addition to the announcement return effect,
beginning with Ohlson and Penman (1985), research has documented a significant increase in
post-split stock volatility.
In this article, we examine whether the composition of a chief executive officer’s (CEO)
compensation portfolio increases the likelihood that the firm will announce a stock split.1 Because
the announcement of a stock split frequently results in a substantial increase in both the price level
and the return volatility, we hypothesize that a CEO whose compensation portfolio is sensitive to
these effects would be more likely to favor a stock split.2 We base our theses on the broad idea
that CEOs with option and stock compensation portfolios benefit from stock splits in two broad
ways. First, an increase in the stock price associated with the split announcement will increase the
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value of both the equity portion of their portfolio and the value of the options in their portfolio.
Second, the increase in price volatility associated with a split will increase the value of the options
in the CEO’s portfolio.
Evidence that CEOs know of the economic effects of splits comes from a variety of sources.
First, survey evidence suggests that CEOs are aware of the positive stock price effects of an-
nouncing a split. For example, in Baker and Powell’s (1993) survey of the management of 251
firms, 73.3% of the respondents agreed with the statement: “A stock split has a favorable market
reaction on a firm’s stock price.” Second, evidence exists that suggests managers time splits
to benefit the firm (e.g., Dyl and Elliott, 2006; Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler, 2009). Third,
anecdotal evidence suggests that managers are keenly aware of the positive stock price effects
surrounding the split announcement. For example, in 2012, Tim Cook, in response to a question
from a stockholder stated that a stock split results in a “short-term pop.”3 Apple announced a
7-for-1 (7:1) split on April 23, 2014, which was greeted by an 8% stock price increase.4 Also,
Starbucks’ CEO, Howard Schultz, believes that shareholders get more excited about a stock
split announcement than any other firm announcement.5 Finally, Devos, Elliott, and Warr (2015)
provide evidence that CEOs are cognizant of the effects that stock split announcements may
have on their compensation portfolios. They report significant clustering of new option grants
before splits and increased levels of stock sales immediately after splits.6 They conclude that
these actions are unlikely to be random and are consistent with the conjecture that option grants
to CEOs are timed such that the CEOs benefit from the largely value-increasing effect of a stock
split.
To quantify how the price and volatility effects of a split might affect a CEO, we use the metrics
developed by Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002), delta (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a
1% change in stock price, stated in thousands of dollars) and vega (the sensitivity of CEO wealth
to a 1% change in the standard deviation (SD) of stock returns, stated in thousands of dollars),
to study the effect of the CEO’s compensation portfolio on the decision to split. As noted by
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Core and Guay (2002), delta and vega are superior to other
proxies (e.g., number of options held, value of options held, and number of options granted) of
the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in the value and volatility of the firm’s stock.
Our article makes several contributions to the literature. First, after controlling for known
determinants of splits, we show that the decision to split is directly related to the delta of the
CEO’s compensation portfolio. This result is not only statistically significant, but we contend
that it is also economically significant. The average (median) CEO wealth gain (in terms of
her stock and option portfolio) is about $4.9 million ($84,000). To our knowledge, we are the
first to examine the relation between CEO compensation and the propensity to announce a stock
split. A potential criticism of our study is that stock splits tend to occur after significant price
run ups and the financial benefit to the CEO of doing a stock split is probably relatively small
compared to the recent wealth gains that she has experienced because of the stock price run up.
We cannot refute this claim, but we can compare the economic significance of our results with
those of other papers that examine CEO actions relative to their personal gain. For example,
Aboody and Kasznik (2000,) in their study of information disclosures around stock grants find
that CEOs have a median gain of about $18,500. They argue that this amount is an economically
3 http://fortune.com/2012/02/23/no-apple-dividend-today/.
4 http://www.businessinsider.com/why-tim-cook-decided-to-do-a-7-for-1-stock-split-2014-4.
5 http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/2015/03/starbucks-announces-2-for-1-stock-split-investors.html.
6 Specifically, Devos et al. (2015) find that timing grants before a split results in an average gain per CEO of about
$450,000, and selling stocks after the split nets on average about $345,000.
meaningful incentive for CEOs and when compared to our economic estimates, this suggests that
our documented wealth effect is economically meaningful as well.
Second, the prior literature posits that the motivations for splitting differ by the split factor
(e.g., Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman, 1998; Kamara and Koski, 2001). We find that the
delta of the CEO’s compensation portfolio is negatively related to the split factor. Empirically, we
also find that the announcement price reaction is unrelated to the split factor. These two results,
when combined, suggest that high-delta CEOs may prefer smaller split sizes because these allow
a firm to split more frequently and provide larger wealth gains in the long run.
When we bifurcate our sample by the split factor, we find that large split factors (2:1 or greater)
exhibit larger post-split increases in volatility. In our tests, we find that vega is positively related
to split size, although economically the importance of delta dominates the vega effect. Therefore,
we doubt that vega is driving split factor sizes.
Third, we find evidence that is consistent with the premise that executive compensation (i.e.,
the delta of the CEO’s compensation portfolio) helps align managerial activities (in this case,
engaging in a stock split that raises the share price and increases the volatility of the returns)
with those of stockholders.7 We find that the likelihood of undertaking a stock split is positively
related to delta but not to the vega of the CEO’s stock and option compensation portfolio. This
finding lends some support to the view that options reward value-enhancing activities.
Our final contribution is to provide further evidence, using a more recent sample, on the
characteristics of splitting firms as well as some of the effects of splitting. For example, we
provide evidence that abnormal returns around the announcement date remain positive and
significant, though at a level of approximately 2% rather than the 3% return found using earlier
sample periods.8 We also document that the Ohlson and Penman (1985) finding, of increased
post-split price volatility, persists even after the decimalization of market prices.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Section I provides a brief literature review and
Section II describes the hypotheses. Section III contains a description of the data and methods
employed, and a univariate analysis of the splitting and nonsplitting firms. Section IV presents
our multivariate results. Section V reports the analysis related to the split factor and contains
additional tests. Section VI discusses the economic significance of our findings and Section VII
states our conclusions.
I. Literature Review
Our article is related to two distinct areas of the literature. First, we review the literature on
the causes and effects of stock splits. Second, we discuss findings on executive compensation,
specifically the role of option-based compensation and executive risk-taking incentives.
A. The Effects and Determinants of Stock Splits
When a firm announces and implements a stock split, there is typically a positive price reaction
on both the announcement day and the ex-date. For example, Ikenberry et al. (1996) report a mean
abnormal return of 3.38% for 2:1 stock splits (N = 1,275) initiated by New York Stock Exchange
7 Several researchers have attempted to use regulatory shocks to investigate the relation between risk taking and incentive
compensation. Hayes et al. (2012) use changes in stock option expensing regulations and Low (2009) uses changes in
takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s.
8 However, our sample firms tend to be relatively large (S&P 1500 firms) and our method may differ in that we report
market-adjusted returns.
(NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) firms from 1975 to 1990. However, they report
a declining trend in announcement returns. In a more recent study covering 1975-2004, Lin,
Singh, and Yu (2009) report an announcement return of more than 3%. Nayar and Rozeff (2001)
provide evidence that the market reacts positively on the ex-date.
In addition to the positive price reaction, there is also an increase in daily return volatility.
Ohlson and Penman (1985) calculate volatility as the mean of the squared daily returns for the
252 days before and after the split ex-date and find an increase in daily return volatility of about
30% beginning on the split ex-date. Their results hold for both daily and weekly data and are not
temporary, but they are unable to identify any rational explanation for the effect. Subsequent work
on this effect by Sheikh (1989) suggests that this volatility increase is reflected in the implied
volatility of options on splitting firms. Koski (1998) finds the volatility increase remains, even
after controlling for bid-ask measurement error and price levels.
Although there are numerous explanations for splits, Easley, O’Hara, and Saar (2001) categorize
them into three broad subgroups: the trading range hypothesis, the reduction of information
asymmetries hypothesis, and the optimal tick size hypothesis.
The trading range hypothesis, first posited by Copeland (1979), suggests that managers desire to
have their firm’s shares traded at a particular stock price to attract specific clienteles. Lakonishok
and Lev (1987) find that firms are likely to split their stock to maintain prices in line with a
marketwide and industrywide average price, as well as a firm-specific price. Evidence consistent
with the clientele effect is provided by Dyl and Elliott (2006), Fernando et al. (2004), Gompers
and Metrick (2001), and Maloney and Mulherin (1992). More recently, Baker et al. (2009) suggest
that managers seek a particular share price to mimic firms with high valuations.
Several papers have hypothesized that splitting behavior may be an attempt to reduce informa-
tion asymmetry by revealing private information or attracting attention to the firm. Brennan and
Copeland (1988) suggest that splits are a signal of improved performance; however, Lakonishok
and Lev (1987) and Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) provide evidence of performance increases
before the split, not after. Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) and Ikenberry et al. (1996) find positive
abnormal performance after the split. Brennan and Copeland (1988) find that the number of
shares outstanding is related to the announcement return, and Brennan and Hughes (1991) find
that changes in analyst coverage are related to the split factor. Others conclude the opposite; for
example, Desai et al. (1998) use a spread decomposition approach and conclude that information
asymmetry does not decrease after a split.
Angel (1997) and Harris (1997) suggest that splitting behavior is related to tick size. Firms
split to increase the ratio of minimum tick size and share price such that dealers are induced to
provide increased liquidity for the stock (see Schultz, 2000; Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, and
Tse, 2005).
Others have examined the effects of split factors. For example, McNichols and Dravid (1990)
suggest the split factor is related to the amount of private information disclosed.
B. Executive Compensation Incentives
To diminish the agency problems related to managerial risk aversion and better align managerial
risk-taking behavior with their own, shareholders often use equity-based compensation (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). Equity-based compensation also mitigates perquisite consumption and
increases effort levels. Stock options in particular have become an increasingly popular element
of equity-based compensation. According to Hall and Murphy (2003), from 1992 to 2000, there
was a 10-fold increase in the value of options granted to top managers of S&P 500 firms. However,
following the recession of 2001, by 2004 the total value of options granted had fallen by more
than 50% of the 2002 level. Overall, this decline in option grants was temporary, as Cao and
Wang (2013) note that from 1994 to 2009, median incentive pay increased by 244% in real terms
whereas firm value increased only 40% during the same period.
The importance of equity-based compensation has resulted in a substantial literature being
developed that analyzes the relation between CEO equity-based compensation, risk taking, and
firm performance.9 During the last decade or so, primarily based on insights provided by Core
and Guay (2002), researchers have begun to use delta (the sensitivity of compensation to a change
in the stock price) and vega (the sensitivity of compensation to a change in the stock volatility)
as measures of managerial compensation and incentives. Empirically, the evidence linking delta
and vega to corporate policies is mixed. Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000) find that increases in
option compensation leads to increases in firm risk; however, they fail to find a significant stock
return response to option-induced risk taking and conclude that the effect is relatively small.
Coles et al. (2006) find that higher levels of vega are associated with a greater propensity to take
risk-increasing actions, including more research and development (R&D) spending, less spending
on fixed assets, greater firm focus, and higher proportions of debt. However, Hayes, Lemmon,
and Qiu (2012) find that vega does not seem to be related to risk-taking activities.10
II. Hypotheses Development
A major finding of the compensation literature, as discussed above, is that delta and vega
are effective proxies for measuring the degree to which CEO incentives are aligned with those
of shareholders. Combined with the empirical fact that a large fraction of stock splits lead to
announcement and ex-date price appreciation as well as increased price volatility in the year
following the split, we hypothesize the following:
H1a: CEOs with stock and option compensation that is more sensitive to share price increases
(i.e., high delta component) are more likely to split their firm’s shares.
H1b: CEOs with stock and option compensation that is more sensitive to volatility (i.e., high
vega component) are more likely to split their firm’s shares.
Our second hypothesis examines the relation between the split factor and the delta of the
CEO’s compensation portfolio. If a CEO’s wealth increases when she conducts a stock split, then
rationally, a CEO would prefer to conduct more, rather than fewer, splits. Empirically, we find
no statistical relation between the average announcement return and the split factor. Therefore,
given this lack of correlation between the announcement return and the split factor, a CEO
whose compensation portfolio has a relatively high delta (ceteris paribus) would likely select a
smaller split factor. This is because a smaller factor will result in approximately the same average
announcement and ex-date price increase as compared to a larger split factor. Therefore, for a
given share price increase over a given period, the CEO could engage in more splits with smaller
factors. Specifically, we hypothesize the following:
9 See Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) for a survey of this literature.
10 Compensation-induced risk-taking behavior may result in negative consequences for shareholders. For example, Cheng
and Warfield (2005) find that equity incentives (i.e., delta) are related to earnings management. Johnson, Ryan, and
Tian (2009) find that delta is related to accounting fraud; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) and Burns and Kedia
(2006) find that delta is related to accounting misstatements. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that delta is related
to accruals. Conversely, Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010) find that
stock-based compensation (delta) is not related to accounting fraud accusations and other accounting irregularities.
H2: CEOs with stock and option compensation that is more sensitive to share price increases
(i.e., high delta component) are more likely to select a smaller split factor.
It is also possible that vega is correlated with the split factor. For example, if larger split factors
are associated with greater post-split price volatility, CEOs whose compensation portfolios have
high levels of vega may prefer a larger split factor. However, we think that this is unlikely to
occur, for two reasons. First, the delta effects appear to dominate the vega effects by an order
of magnitude. Second, although a price increase can have a direct realizable impact on CEO
wealth, a volatility increase is harder to capitalize on given the nontradability of executive stock
options.
III. Data and Methods
A. Sample
We use the ExecuComp database to compute a delta and vega for each firm with available data
between 1992 and 2005.11 This produces a sample of 21,414 firm-years covering 2,704 unique
firms. We then gather the financial accounting data necessary to compute our control variables
from Compustat. Because of missing data or nonpositive assets or revenues, the sample size
decreases to 20,863 firm-years and 2,643 unique firms. Market data and split data are gathered
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Any firm in the sample that
has a CRSP distribution code of 5523 and a CRSP share factor of at least 0.5 (i.e., engages in
at least a 3:2 split) at any time during the sample period is identified as a stock split. We find
1,837 splits made by 1,107 unique firms. We also gather return data around the split declaration
and ex-dates as well as price data (to compute price appreciation in the preceding years as well
as price volatility in the post-split year) from CRSP.
We filter the sample to remove extreme outliers and potential coding errors with the following
restrictions. The share price must be greater than $5 and less than $10,000. We remove firms
with a debt-to-assets (Compustat item #181 ÷ #6) or debt-to-equity (#181 ÷ [#6 − #181]) ratio
greater than 1 or 500, respectively. We restrict the sample to firms that have a positive value for
total common equity (#60). Finally, to allow computation of a price appreciation measure, we
require that the firm exist in the CRSP database for three years before the sample year.12 The
final sample has 19,178 firm-years from 2,501 unique firms. During the sample period, there
were a total of 1,617 splits made by 1,027 firms.
We show the temporal distribution of splitting and nonsplitting firms in Table I. The table
provides several insights. First, there are 1,617 stock splits and 17,561 firm-years in which firms
do not split. Second, the number of splits during a given year ranges from 41 (in 1992) to 172 (in
1995). As a percentage of all sample firms, on an annual basis, between 5% (in 2002) and 13%
(in 1995 and 1997) of firms split. For most years this percentage is around 10%. Only 2000–2002
seems to have a smaller number of splits.
11 The database contains, among other variables, complete details related to executive stock and option grants for more
than 3,300 firms. From the ExecuComp data description manual: “The universe of firms cover the S&P 1500 plus
companies that were once part of the 1500 plus companies removed from the index that are still trading, and some client
requests. Data collection on the S&P 1500 began in 1994. However, there is data back to 1992 but it is not the entire S&P
1500.” Several key variables were reported during this period that enable us to compute the vega and delta. After 2005,
these key variables were no longer recorded.
12 In unreported results, we replicate the tests using four- and five-year restrictions. The results are qualitatively similar.
Table I. Stock Splits by Year
This table presents the number of splitting (firms that engage in at least a 3:2 stock split) and nonsplitting
firms by year.
Splitting Nonsplitting Splits (%)
1992 41 366 11
1993 77 990 8
1994 126 1,299 10
1995 172 1,314 13
1996 153 1,347 11
1997 166 1,328 13
1998 161 1,392 12
1999 163 1,411 12
2000 91 1,410 6
2001 78 1,397 6
2002 64 1,361 5
2003 113 1,427 8
2004 132 1,397 9
2005 80 1,122 7
Total (for Cols. 1 and 2), Mean (for Col. 3) 1,617 17,561 9
B. Price and Volatility Effects around Splits
Our hypotheses critically depend on whether splits lead to positive returns around the an-
nouncement date and increased volatility after the split. In Table II, we show abnormal returns
around the announcement dates and ex-dates, and pre- and post-split volatility. We calculate two-
day (day 0 to +1) and three-day (day −1 to +1) market-adjusted holding period returns on the
announcement and ex-dates of the split using the CRSP value-weighted dividend-adjusted returns
as the market index. Our results are generally consistent with the previous literature. The mean
(median) three-day market-adjusted announcement return is about 2.0% (1.3%). This return is
lower than Ikenberry et al. (1996), who report a mean of 3.38% for 2:1 stock splits (N = 1,275)
initiated by NYSE and AMEX firms from 1975 to 1990.13 However, they report a declining trend
in announcement returns.14 The mean market-adjusted return around the ex-date is approximately
0.6%. We also report a compound return for the announcement plus ex-date (using a three-day
window around each date). The mean (median) compound return is 2.5% (1.9%). To determine
whether volatility increases after the split, we follow Ohlson and Penman (1985), who calculate
volatility as the mean of the squared daily returns for the 252 days before and after the split ex-
date. The mean (median) volatility before the split is 0.0008 (0.0004), whereas after the split the
mean (median) increases to 0.0011 (0.0006). In other words, the average daily volatility increases
by about 37%. Ohlson and Penman (1985) report a nearly 30% increase in daily volatility during
their earlier sample period. This is approximately equivalent to an annual mean (median) SD of
returns of 44.9% (31.7%) before the split and 52.6% (38.9%) after the split.
A pairwise test for the difference in pre- and postyear volatility shows that this increase
is statistically significant (the mean difference is 0.0003). In addition, more than 70% of the
13 The Ikenberry et al. (1996) return spans five days, from day −2 to day +2 around the split announcement.
14 Lin et al. (2009) also report an announcement return of more than 3% for 1975-2004.
Table II. Price Effects of Stock Splits
This table presents market-adjusted returns over various windows as well as pre- and post-split return
volatility. Panel A displays the average compounded announcement date and ex-date returns for stock splits
with a split factor of at least 1.5 (i.e., 3:2) between 1992 and 2005. We use the CRSP value-weighted
dividend-adjusted returns for the market. In Panel B, volatility is calculated as the mean squared daily return
for the 252 trading days on either side of the ex-date. In the third row of the panel, paired difference in
volatility is calculated using a (pairwise) t-test.
Split Sample (N = 1,617)
Mean Median
Panel A. Returns
Announcement date (0 to +1) 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗
Announcement date (−1 to +1) 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
Ex-date (0 to +1) 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗
Ex-date (−1 to +1) 0.0058∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗
Compound announcement (−1 to +1) and ex-date (−1 to +1) 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗
Panel B. Volatility
Pre-split 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
Post-split 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗
Paired difference (post – pre) 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
splitting firms show increased volatility. This finding is consistent with Ohlson and Penman
(1985) and may provide the impetus for CEOs to split their shares, especially when the vega
component of the CEO’s compensation package is relatively high.
C. Hypothesis Testing
To test our hypotheses, we examine the extent to which delta and vega are associated with
the decision to split using a logistic regression model with additional control variables (see
Equation (1)).
P(Spli t j,t = 1|x j,t ) = G(x j,t , α), (1)
where G(x j,tα) = 1
1+e−x j,t α and xj,t α = α0 + α1 {CEO Compensation Measures}j,t−1 + α2
{Trading Range Controls}j,t−1 + α3 {Information Asymmetry Controls}j,t−1 + α4 {Optimal Tick
Size Controls}j,t−1 + α5 market-to-bookj,t−1 + α6 ln[totalassetsj,t−1].15
CEO compensation measures are the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in share
price (ln[deltaj,t−1]) and/or to changes in share price volatility (ln[vegaj,t−1]). Both variables are
calculated at the end of the previous fiscal year (denoted by subscript t − 1, whereas j represents
firm j). On average, a split results in an increase in both the level and the volatility of the stock
price; therefore, we expect the coefficients on ln[deltaj,t−1] and ln[vegaj,t−1] to be positive.
15 To control for industry and time effects, we also include industry (based on two-digit Standard industrial classification
[SIC] codes) and year dummies.
In addition, we include control variables commonly found in prior research. Ikenberry et al.
(1996) find an inverse (direct) relation between the split abnormal announcement return and
firm size (market-to-book). Although our dependent variable is the decision to split rather than
the announcement return, it is likely that a similar relation may hold in our model. For this
reason, we use market-to-bookj,t−1, which is the market value of equity scaled by book value,
and ln[totalassetsj,t−1], which is the natural log of the book value of total assets. We follow Dyl
and Elliott (2006) and include three proxies to control for trading range explanations. The first is
traderangej,t−1, which is a binary variable that is equal to one when the actual share price is 50%
or more of the predicted share price, where predicted share price is the predicted value from an
annual regression of average share price on book value of equity, average value of shareholdings,
and earnings per share (in Section III.D, we describe this variable in more detail).16 The second
variable is stockapprj,t−1, which captures the amount of stock appreciation in the prior two years
(computed as the ratio of fiscal year-end sharepricet−1 to sharepricet−3, where sharepricej,t−1
is the closing price on the last day of the fiscal year). For traderangej,t−1 and stockapprj,t−1, we
expect a positive relation with the likelihood of a split. The third variable is institownj,t−1, which is
the percentage of shares owned by institutions.17 For institownj,t−1, we expect a negative relation
with the likelihood of a split.
We use two variables to control for explanations based on information asymmetry: analyst
following (analystsj,t−1) and number of shareholders (shareholdersj,t−1). We expect a negative
relation for both variables with the likelihood of a split. Finally, to control for optimal tick size
explanations, we use year dummies because the move from eighths to sixteenths that occurred
in 1997 and the decimalization that occurred in 2001 may affect optimal tick sizes (e.g.,
Kadapakkam et al., 2005; Lipson and Mortal, 2006). These dummies are labeled predecimaliza-
tion (postdecimalization) and they equal one for firm years before (after) 1997 (2000). If firms
attempt to use a split in a Brennan and Hughes (1991) sense (i.e., increase overall gain to brokers
by forcing a wider relative spread, which is expected to increase the firm’s shareholder base), we
expect a positive relation between predecimalization and the decision to split. We have no priors
with regard to postdecimalization.
D. Variable Construction and Univariate Analysis
1. Variable Measurement
We measure the sensitivity of CEO compensation to changes in equity return levels and
volatility.18 The first variable, deltat−1, is the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes (1973)
equation with respect to the stock price level, and it measures the incentive to increase the stock
price. The second variable, vegat−1, is the partial derivative of the dividend-adjusted Black-
Scholes (1973) equation with respect to the SD of stock returns, and it measures the incentive to
take risk. We compute delta and vega for each CEO’s stock and option portfolio to measure CEO
16 In addition to these trading range controls, we also estimate the original trading range variable reported in Lakonishok
and Lev (1987), which compares the splitting firm’s stock price with that of a portfolio of comparable firms. Our results
(untabulated) are robust to this test.
17 Given that most trading range explanations for splitting assume that managers split in order to attract individual
shareholders (vis-à-vis institutional shareholders), we include institutional ownership prior to the split. In additional
(unreported, but available upon request) analysis we use an additional variable to capture the trading range explanation
for splits, based on Lakonishok and Lev (1987). Our results do not materially change.
18 We use the approach of Rogers (2002) and Core and Guay (2002) to create measures of a CEO’s incentive to engage in
risk-taking activities for the firm.
risk-taking incentives.19 We use Compustat data to calculate other variables used in our analyses:
market-to-bookt−1 ([#25 × #199] ÷ #60), totalassetst−1 (#6), netsalest−1 (#12), debt-to-equityt−1
(#181 ÷ [#6 − #181]), EPSt−1 (#58), and ROEt−1 ([#25 × #58] ÷ #60).
We now turn to the characteristics related to the three potential split explanations (trading
range, asymmetric information, and tick size). First, we consider the variables that proxy for the
trading range explanation. The variable traderanget−1 indicates whether the price of the stock is
too high, and the variable stockapprt−1 measures the increase in the firm’s stock price over the
two years preceding year t. traderangej,t is defined as follows:
traderange j,t = shareprice j,t/E
(
shareprice j,t | BVEquity j,t , AvgHldg j,t , EPSj,t
)
, (2)
where E(shareprice j,t−1 | BVEquity j,t−1, AvgHldg j,t−1, EPSj,t−1) is estimated by Equation (3):
E
(
shareprice j,t−1 | BVEquity j,t−1, AvgHldg j,t−1, EPSj,t−1
) = δ0 + δ1BVEquity j,t−1
+ δ2AvgHldg j,t−1, + δ3EPSj,t−1, (3)
where BVEquityj,t−1 is book value of equity (#60), AvgHldgj,t−1 is total equity per shareholder,
and EPSj,t−1 is year t−1 earnings per share.
We compute traderangej,t−1 as the ratio of a firm’s actual share price in year t − 1 to its predicted
share price from Equation (3), conditioned on the firm’s size, average holdings per shareholder,
and earnings per share. There is no reason to expect that small differences from traderangej,t−1
are important, so we convert it to a binary variable that equals one if the actual share price is 50%
greater than the predicted price and zero otherwise. The stockapprj,t−1 variable is the proportional
increase in firm j’s split-adjusted average stock price during the two years preceding the split
year, and is computed as follows:
stockappr j,t−1 = shareprice j,t−1/shareprice j,t−3. (4)
Institutional ownership (institownj,t−1) data from Compact Disclosure represents the ownership
by all institutions as a percentage of total shares outstanding. However, data for this variable are
available only until 2004. As information asymmetry proxies, we use the number of analysts from
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) (analystsj,t−1) and the number of shareholders
(shareholdersj,t−1). Finally, to capture the optimal tick size explanation, we use the stock price
before the split, from CRSP.
2. Univariate Results
In Table III, we compare splitting firms with the full sample of all nonsplitting firms (which
we use as the sample for the rest of the article). We also provide test statistics to assess the
difference between the subsamples. Consistent with H1a and H1b, CEOs of splitting firms have
significantly higher values of delta and vega. They have a mean deltat−1 (vegat−1) of 2,967 (163)
compared to 1,027 (147) for managers of nonsplitting firms. These results suggest that, as it
relates to stock splits, managers whose compensation has greater incentives to increase price and
risk may indeed do so.
19 For pure stock holdings, delta = 1 and vega = 0. A detailed description of the calculation of delta and vega is provided
in the Appendix.
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Splitting firms have an average (median) market-to-bookt−1 of 4.99 (3.42), whereas nonsplitting
firms have an average (median) market-to-bookt−1 of 3.35 (2.21). Both the mean and median
are significantly different at the 1% level. This finding suggests that splitting firms are relatively
more highly valued and are more typically growth stocks. Splitting firms are slightly smaller in
terms of assets, but have nearly the same level of annual sales. For example, the mean (median)
totalassetst−1 for splitting firms is $10.2 billion ($1.4 billion), whereas the mean (median)
totalassetst−1 for nonsplitting firms is $11.5 billion ($1.5 billion). Splitting firms have lower
debt-to-equityt−1 ratios and are more profitable in terms of EPSt−1 and ROEt−1, again consistent
with their being more growth-oriented stocks.
The traderanget−1 variable is equal to one if the share price is more than 50% above the
predicted price and zero otherwise.20 Only a very small, but significantly different, fraction
between splitting and nonsplitting firms is above this 50% threshold. The mean (median) value
of traderanget−1 for splitting firms is 1.42% (0.00%), whereas the corresponding value for
nonsplitting firms is 0.29% (0.00%). The mean difference is statistically significant and indicates
that a significantly higher percentage of splitting firms have share prices that are “too high,”
and the split will thus bring them back in line with their expected share price. Table III shows
that stockapprt−1 is significantly higher for splitting firms. We find that splitting firms had an
average stockapprt−1 of 37%, compared to 22% for nonsplitting firms. The medians show a
similar pattern.
Splitting firms have significantly higher institutional ownership (i.e., the mean for splitting
firms is 60% versus 59% for nonsplitting firms; the medians show the same pattern). Al-
though these differences are statistically significant, the economic significance is small. Overall,
these findings suggest that trading range explanations may indeed be related to the splitting
decision.
For the information asymmetry proxies, we find that splitting firms are followed by an average
(median) of 9.1 (6.9) analystst−1, whereas nonsplitting firms are followed by an average (median)
of 8.1 (6.2) analystst−1. The number of shareholders (shareholderst−1) is slightly smaller for
splitting firms. These results seem to be mixed, given that we expect firms with greater information
asymmetry to have lower levels of both analyst following and number of shareholders.
We find that the mean share price is higher for splitting firms. The mean share price is more
than $54 for splitting firms and about $32 for nonsplitting firms. This evidence appears to be
most consistent with the trading range hypothesis.
IV. Relation between the Decision to Split and Compensation
Incentives
A. Multivariate Analysis
To further examine our primary hypotheses, namely, firms whose CEOs have compensation
portfolios with a higher delta and vega are more likely to split their firm’s stock, we estimate a logit
regression as described in Equation (1). The results are presented in Table IV. The table shows the
odds ratios and the corresponding p-values in parentheses. The first column models the decision
to split as a function of CEO compensation sensitivity (ln[deltat−1] and ln[vegat−1]), the market-
to-book ratio (market-to-bookt−1), and the natural log of assets (ln[assetst−1]).21 Consistent with
20 Our results remain qualitatively similar when we use 10% or 25%.
21 All models include year dummies.
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the univariate results in the previous section, the odds ratio of ln[deltat−1] is greater than one
and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient on ln[vegat−1] is insignifi-
cant. Model 2 has the same variables; however, we added industry fixed effects and the result is
similar. Models 3 and 4 include additional variables to control for the optimal tick-size explana-
tion. The results on the CEO compensation sensitivity variables remain qualitatively unchanged.
Models 5 and 6 add variables intended to control for the trading range explanation of splits,
and Models 7 and 8 add controls for the information asymmetry split explanation. In all cases,
ln[deltat−1] remains significantly greater than one whereas the coefficient on ln[vegat−1] contin-
ues to be not statistically different from one. In sum, the results support H1a, though there is no
support for H1b in the multivariate models. To put these numbers into perspective, at the sample
mean for ln[deltat−1] of 5.4 (which equates to a deltat−1 of 221.4), an increase to 6.4 (deltat−1
equal to 601.8) would increase the probability of a split by approximately 39%, ceteris paribus. A 1
SD shift from the mean (SD = 1.718; deltat−1 of 1,234.0) would increase the probability of a split
by 67%.
To assure that our results are not due to model misspecification, we conduct the fol-
lowing robustness test. Because deltat−1 and vegat−1 are positively correlated (correlation
coefficient = 0.45), we estimate all the models from Table IV with only ln[deltat−1] and again
with only ln[vegat−1]. The results (untabulated) for the models that include only ln[deltat−1] are
qualitatively similar to Table IV. In the models that include only ln[vegat−1], the coefficient on
ln[vegat−1] is statistically significant in all specifications. Also, although we attempt to control
for the skewness of deltat−1 and vegat−1 using logs, as an alternative control we create an indicator
value for each variable representing the top quintile, that is, the largest 20% of values of deltat−1
and vegat−1. We repeat the Table IV regressions using these new variables and find qualitatively
similar results (untabulated).
V. Relation between Split Factor Choice and Compensation
Incentives
In this section, we investigate how returns and volatility shifts, following a split announcement,
differ by split factor. These results are reported in Table V. For 3:2 splits, we find mean (median)
three-day (−1 to +1) market-adjusted announcement returns of 1.79% (1.22%), whereas splits
of 2:1 or larger generate mean (median) returns of 2.04% (1.40%). However, these returns are not
statistically different from one another, nor are the ex-date or compound returns (accumulated
across the announcement and ex-dates). Likewise, we find only marginally significant differences
in volatility (only for the median) before the split. However, 2:1 splitters exhibit a mean increase
in volatility of 0.0004 after the split, compared to 0.0002 for 3:2 splitters. The means and
medians are significantly different across the two split factors. It appears that the split factor does
not affect market-adjusted announcement or ex-date returns; however, it does affect post-split
volatility. Therefore, it follows that delta and vega could have different effects on the decision to
undertake a large (2:1 or greater) or small (3:2) split. Given that the returns are not different, it
could be argued that delta would have little effect on the choice of split factor. However, if returns
are unaffected by split factor, a rational CEO might prefer a smaller factor that would enable
more frequent splits in the future.22
22 Conversely, if a large split (2:1 or greater) has a larger impact on volatility, one might expect that CEOs with relatively
more exposure to vega in their compensation portfolio (i.e., greater incentive to take on firm-specific risk) would opt for
a larger split factor. However, because the CEO’s stock options are nontradable, the impact of vega may well be limited
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A. Univariate Analysis
In Table VI, we present univariate results when the splitting sample is bifurcated by large
versus small (i.e., 2:1 and greater vs. 3:2) split factors. The table shows that there are significant
differences between these groups. Both the mean and median for deltat−1 and vegat−1 are
significantly larger for 2:1 splitters. However, the significance levels are substantially lower
for deltat−1.
Firms with split factors of 2:1 or greater have significantly higher market-to-bookt−1 ratios.
They also are significantly larger when measured by net salest−1 but not when measured by total
assetst−1. Earnings per share (EPSt−1) for firms using large split factors are also significantly
higher.
All three variables related to the trading range explanation are different across split factors.
Nearly 2% of firms using large split factors were at least 50% above their predicted price range,
whereas only 0.2% of firms using 3:2 factors were similarly situated. The level of stockapprt−1
during the two years before the split was also slightly higher for firms using large split fac-
tors. Large splitters have slightly higher institutional ownership, although the difference is of
questionable economic significance (61% vs. 59%). Proxies for information asymmetry split
explanations are also substantially different between the two split factors. Firms using 2:1 splits
have significantly more analystst−1 and shareholderst−1, which suggests they exhibit relatively
less information asymmetry.
Firms that engage in larger splits have, on average, significantly higher pre-split share prices.
For example, the mean sharepricet−1 for large splits is $62.23, compared to a mean sharepricet−1
of $37.65 for firms that split by 3:2, consistent with the optimal tick size explanation.
B. Multivariate Analysis
In Table VII, we test H2 and examine the relation between the delta of CEO compensation
and the split factor in a multivariate setting. Using a logistic regression, we estimate Equation
(1), except in this case, the dependent variable equals one if the firm engages in a 2:1 or larger
split, and zero if the split factor is 3:2. Similar to the analysis of the decision to split, we estimate
eight models and include temporal fixed effects in all models and industry fixed effects in the
even-numbered models. The odds ratio for ln[deltat−1] is significant and less than one in all
eight models. A one-standard deviation increase in ln[deltat−1] (from an average of 6.17-7.84)
decreases the probability of a 2:1 (or greater) split by 15.6%. These results are the reverse of the
univariate findings, in which case the CEOs of firms that engaged in larger splits (i.e., 2:1 or
greater) had greater delta sensitivity (i.e., higher average levels of delta). The multivariate results
suggest an inverse relation between delta and the propensity to choose a 2:1 split. At first, this may
appear to be puzzling, but when viewed in light of the findings presented in Table V, this result
is consistent with our hypothesis. Table V shows that statistically, there is no difference between
the abnormal returns of 3:2 and 2:1 (or greater) split factors on either the announcement date or
ex-date. Therefore, one could conclude that for CEOs with higher delta exposure, a smaller split
factor would achieve the same increase in CEO wealth as a larger split factor, and possibly allow
for another split sooner than if a larger split factor had been chosen.23 In sum, the evidence from
Table VII provides support for H2.
because the CEO cannot directly realize this gain by selling the options. We therefore expect that in practice the delta
effect will dominate split factor choice.
23 In all eight models, the odds ratio on ln[vegat−1] is greater than one and is significant. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that CEOs with compensation that is more sensitive to price volatility are induced to select split factors that
increase volatility. The average ln[vegat−1] is 3.65. An increase of 1 SD (i.e., ln[vegat−1] equal to 5.66) would increase
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C. Additional Tests
1. Multiple Splits
During our sample period, several firms engaged in multiple splits. This may induce a bias in
our primary regressions due to lack of independence and/or a positive bias in subsequent vega
and delta estimates, as the first split increases post-split price volatility and that volatility is used
to estimate vega and delta for the following years. The frequency of sample firms with multiple
splits is as follows: 1 firm splits seven times during the 14-year sample, two firms split six times,
four firms split five times, 20 firms split four times, 97 firms split three times, and 257 firms
split two times. These events could affect our coefficient estimates and so we remove all multiple
splits from the sample that are not separated by at least two years. This filter results in 141 splits
being removed from the sample. We repeat our multivariate analysis (i.e., Tables IV and VII) and
find, in untabulated results, that our main conclusions do not change.
2. Time Series of Splits
The frequency with which a firm splits may matter, especially with regard to the split factor. We
posit that CEOs may decide to split using a relatively small split factor, because this presumably
would allow them to split more frequently and experience a more frequent positive announcement
return. To determine whether this occurs, we calculate the number of days between the initial and
any subsequent splits (while requiring that the subsequent split occurs within three years). For the
210 firms that announce a 2:1 split and later split again, there are, on average, 628 days between
announcements (the median is 656 days). For the 179 firms that announce a 3:2 split and then
announce a subsequent split, there are, on average, 576 days between announcements (the median
is 524 days). The difference in both the means and the medians is statistically significant at the
5% level. For firms that initially announce a 3:2 split, 36.5% split again within the following three
years. Of those that split again, 83% announce a second 3:2 split and only 17% use a larger split
factor. For firms that initially announce a 2:1 or larger split, only 18.7% announce a subsequent
split during the next three years. Of those second splits, 90% use a 2:1 or larger split. Overall,
these results suggest that firms that announce a 3:2 split are nearly twice as likely to announce a
second split within the following three years as compared to firms that initially announce a 2:1
split.24
3. Option Vesting
CEO option portfolios typically include both vested and unvested options, and the vesting
period is, on average, about two years (in both the ExecuComp data and our sample). In addition,
other researchers (e.g., Hall and Murphy, 2002) show that CEOs tend to exercise their options
the probability of a 2:1 split by about 34%. However, delta is at least an order of magnitude larger then vega (this is
approximately true for the median as well). Because both delta and vega represent a dollar change in value for a 1%
change in the level and volatility (respectively) of the stock, it is very likely that the delta effect completely dominates
the vega effect. For this reason, although there is a statistical significance, we do not consider the effect of vega on the
choice of split factor.
24 To further investigate whether a timing effect occurs, we perform a duration analysis that controls for sample censoring.
Specifically, for the sample of 1,617 splitting firms, we use the Cox proportional hazards regression model and investigate
whether the size (either 3:2 or 2:1 or larger) of the split has an effect on the likelihood of splitting in the future while
controlling for the same firm characteristics as in the full model from Table VII. We find that the expected hazard is 1.6
for firms that initially announced a 3:2 stock split. The results of this analysis are consistent with our earlier findings that
firms that undertake a 3:2 split undertake their next split faster than those firms that undertake a 2:1 split. We thank the
editor for suggesting this line of analysis.
quickly after they become vested. Therefore, their portfolios tend to be dominated by unvested
options.
It is possible that CEOs may care more about immediate, realizable gains related to a split
announcement. To the extent that they do, we would expect that a CEO with a relatively large
amount of vested options to be more likely to endorse a stock split because their gains would be
immediate.
To test this assertion, we estimate the coefficients from Equation (1), except that instead of
using a single delta and vega, we calculate separate deltas and vegas for the vested and unvested
portions of the CEO’s portfolio. In the interest of conserving space, we do not tabulate these
results. The definitions of vested versus unvested options come from ExecuComp. Vested options
are defined as those that are “unexercised and exercisable.” Conversely, unvested options are
defined as those that are “unexercised and unexercisable.”
Turning first to the vested options, in our reestimation of Equation (1), we find that ln[deltat−1]
has a coefficient of 1.186, indicating that the sensitivity of vested options to stock price changes
is positively correlated with the likelihood of a split announcement. For the unvested options,
we observe that ln[deltat−1] has a coefficient of 1.968, clearly much higher than the vested
options.
These results suggest that vested options are not driving our main findings. Instead, it appears
CEOs value the effect of the split on their unvested portfolio. This result is perhaps not surprising
given that the older unvested portfolio is likely to be larger than the vested portfolio for two
reasons. First, empirical evidence shows that CEOs tend to exercise options very quickly once
they become vested; therefore, vested options that remain are likely to be relatively few. Second,
the older unvested options are likely to be greater in number because they have accumulated over
at least two years.
VI. Economic Significance
In this section, we estimate the economic significance of a split in terms of the wealth gain for
the average CEO. There are several ways we can do this. The first method looks at the change in
the value of the CEO’s option and stock portfolio using the vega and delta values of that portfolio.
This method is probably an upper bound in that it captures the intrinsic and time value gains as a
result of the split. By construction, it is the only method that incorporates the effect of changes in
volatility on the option portfolio. The second method accounts only for the intrinsic value gains
of the option and stock portfolio. Finally, the third method computes a conservative measure of
value, using only the intrinsic value gain of the exercisable options and unrestricted stock in the
CEO’s portfolio. This gain represents the cash gain that the CEO could earn if she exercised her
options and sold her stock immediately after the split.
Starting with the first method, Table II shows a mean pre-split volatility of 0.0008 and a
post-split volatility of 0.0011. Converting these to daily SDs and annualizing them (assuming
250 trading days), the change in the annualized SD is 7.72%. The average vega (from Table III)
is 163 and represents the change in wealth (in thousands of dollars) for a 0.01 change in the
annual SD. Thus, the economic effect of a 7.72% increase in SD on the average option portfolio is
7.72 × 163,000 = $1,258,360. For the effect of the stock price increase, we take the three-day
split announcement abnormal return of 1.96% (from Table II) multiplied by the average delta
of 2,967 (from Table III), which represents (in thousands) the dollar change in the value of the
option and stock portfolio for a 1% change in the stock price. The total wealth gain associated
with delta is 1.96 × 2,967,000 = $5,815,320. The wealth effect for vega and delta combined is
therefore $7,073,680. When we perform the same analysis on the median values, we obtain a
combined wealth gain of $985,194.
Our second method looks at only the intrinsic value gain for the entire portfolio. For unexercis-
able options, the mean (median) change in value is $225,684 ($0.00) and for exercisable options,
the mean (median) change in value is $373,002 ($6,052). The mean (median) change in the value
of shares held by the CEO is $4,533,758 ($77,719).25 Summing all three results in a total average
(median) change in value of $5,132,444 ($83,771).
Our final and most conservative method is to only include the exercisable options and unre-
stricted stocks. Using the numbers in the previous paragraph, these result in a mean (median)
gain of $4,906,760 ($83,771).
VII. Conclusion
The literature investigating stock splits has consistently documented a positive announcement
and ex-date return as well as an increased return volatility during the year following the split.
In this article, rather than seeking to explain why these return and volatility effects occur, we
instead argue that, at the margin, the long-documented existence of the return and volatility effects
may incentivize a CEO to pursue a stock split. Specifically, we use the delta and vega measures
developed by Core and Guay (2002) and Guay (1999) to measure the sensitivity of the CEO’s
stock and option compensation to price changes (delta) and volatility changes (vega).
We hypothesize that CEOs with compensation portfolios that have high deltas and vegas are
more likely to split their firm’s shares. We find partial support for these hypotheses. Although
delta is positively related to the decision to announce a stock split, we find no relation between
vega and the split announcement. However, when we examine the impact of delta and vega
on the choice of split factor, we find a negative relation between delta and the split factor. A
possible explanation for this result is that there is no statistical difference in the magnitude of
the announcement return in relation to the split factor. A CEO with a high delta can maximize
her wealth by selecting a smaller split factor today and then splitting again sooner rather than
selecting a larger split factor that reduces the probability of future splits.
Only a fraction of all the options in a CEO’s compensation portfolio are vested. Because the
unvested options represent only a “paper” gain and cannot be exercised in the immediate future,
they may have a limited impact on the decision to split. In additional tests, our results do not
appear to be driven by vested options alone. Instead, we find evidence that the unvested portion
of the CEO’s option portfolio has an important effect on the split decision.
Our empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that CEO stock and option compensation
can affect the stock split decision. Furthermore, the results lend support to the contention that
equity-based CEO compensation packages help align the actions of CEOs with those desired by
shareholders, in part by making CEOs behave as though they are less risk averse. Finally, our
results are economically significant, as the average CEO can realize gains of about $4.9 million
by completing a stock split and then selling his/her stock and exercising options.
Appendix: Computing Vega and Delta for the CEO’s Stock
and Option Holdings
We follow Rogers (2002), who in turn follows Core and Guay (2002) in computing the option
sensitivities to volatility and price. Delta measures the option value’s sensitivity with respect to
25 Note that this value can be negative if the price reaction surrounding the split is negative.
a 1% change in stock price, and vega measures the option value’s sensitivity to a 0.01 change in
SD. These values are computed as:
Delta :
∂Value
∂S
S
100
= e−dT N (d1) S
100
, (A1)
Vega :
∂Value
∂σ
× 0.01 = 0.01[e−dT N ′(d1)S
√
T ], (A2)
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d1 = In(S/X ) + T (r − d + σ
2/2)
σ
√
T
.
N() is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution, N′() is the normal
probability density function, S is the share price of the stock at the fiscal year-end, d is the
dividend yield as of fiscal year-end, X is the exercise price of the option, r is the risk-free rate (we
use the risk-free rate provided in ExecuComp), σ is the annualized standard derivation of daily
stock returns measured over 120 days before fiscal year-end, and T is remaining years to maturity
of option.
The data for estimation are from ExecuComp (and originally from the proxy statements);
however, the exercise price and maturity are only available for the current year’s option grants.
Therefore, to estimate prior years’ exercise prices and maturities, we follow the Core and Guay
(2002, p. 617) algorithm. The proxy statement provides realizable values of options grants (i.e., the
excess of the stock price over the exercise price). Because X and T are computed separately for new
options, the number and fiscal year-end realizable value of new options must be deducted from
the number and realizable value of unexercisable options. Dividing unexercisable (excluding new
grants) and exercisable realized values by the number of unexercisable and exercisable options
held by the executive, respectively, yields estimates of, on average, how far each of the groups
of options are in the money. Subtracting this number from the stock price yields the average
exercise price. The exercise price is computed for exercisable and unexercisable options. The
time to maturity for the exercisable options is the maturity of the new grants less one year (or nine
years if no new grant is made). For the unexercisable options, the time to maturity is the maturity
of the new grants less three years (or six years if no grant is made). We treat the stock holdings
of the CEO as having a vega of zero and a delta of one and include them in the computation of
vega to delta.
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